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Abstract
There is widespread disagreement about what equality of opportunity in education requires. 
For some it is that each child is legally permitted to go to school. For others it is that each child 
receives the same educational resources. Further interpretations abound. This fact presents a 
problem: when politicians or academics claim they are in favour of equality of opportunity in 
education, it is unclear what they mean and debate is hindered by mutual misunderstanding. 
In this article, I introduce a framework to ameliorate this problem. More specifically, I develop 
an important but neglected framework for the concept of equality of opportunity and apply it 
to examine particular conceptions of equality of opportunity in education. In doing this, I hope to 
produce a piece of applied conceptual analysis that can both help clarify existing positions within 
the equality of opportunity in education debate and allow those seeking to produce new positions 
to express them more clearly.
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There is widespread disagreement about what equality of opportunity in education 
requires. This disagreement ranges across a number of distinct dimensions. For example, 
suppose it could be agreed that equality of opportunity in education requires that no mor-
ally arbitrary factors should differentiate attainment between children. We would still 
have to ask both what counts as a morally arbitrary factor and what terms attainment 
should be measured in. Even if these controversies were resolved, we would not know 
which children were in the relevant group: all children in a particular state, the nation or 
the world?
The fact that equality of opportunity in education admits so many interpretations has 
led some authors to reject it or come close to rejecting it (Jencks, 1988; Westen, 1982, 
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1985). As Christopher Jencks (1998) puts it, the worry is not merely that achieving 
equality of opportunity in education might be impractical, but ‘whether an idea that can 
embrace so much means anything at all’. I believe that this inference would be a mistake. 
More precisely, while it is true that equality of opportunity in education may be inter-
preted in many different ways, it should not be inferred from this that progress cannot be 
made about its meaning. To determine which conception or set of conceptions we ought 
to endorse, we should begin by considering both the conceptual structure of equality of 
opportunity in education and which value(s) motivate our concern for it. That is the pri-
mary aim of this article.
A further aim of this article can be made clear by way of an analogy. In Life’s 
Dominion, Ronald Dworkin (1993) argues that we may reorient the debate about abor-
tion, viewing the fundamental disagreement between conservatives and liberals to be 
about what gives life value rather than about whether or not a foetus is a person. When 
we accept this reorientation, Dworkin claims, those on different sides of the debate will 
have a clearer idea of what is at stake, offering new possibilities for compromise and 
resolution. I believe we may similarly reorient the debate about equality of opportunity 
in education. Rather than viewing it in terms of those who are in favour and those who 
are opposed or, as is more common, one side labelling the other as disingenuous in their 
stated commitment, we may view disagreement about equality of opportunity in educa-
tion as disagreement about the values, or the interpretations of the values, to which we 
are trying to respond via a conception of equality of opportunity in education.
The article comes in five sections. The first section presents the structure of the con-
cept of equality of opportunity and discusses where value considerations enter into that 
structure. The second section considers what kinds of values might motivate a concep-
tion of equality of opportunity in education and presents a series of examples to illustrate 
how different popular conceptions of equality of opportunity are motivated by different 
values. The third section considers how equality of opportunity in general relates to 
equality of opportunity in education in particular. The fourth section considers how dif-
ferent conceptions of equality of opportunity in education might apply at different levels, 
the interpersonal and the institutional. The fifth section concludes.
The structure of the concept
Before presenting the structure of the concept of equality of opportunity, allow me to 
elaborate the distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’. The term ‘concept’ refers 
to a general notion or idea. The term ‘conception’ refers to a specific interpretation of a 
notion or idea. Rawls (1993) illustrates this distinction in relation to justice in the follow-
ing passage:
The concept of justice, applied to an institution, means, say, that the institution makes no 
arbitrary distinctions between persons in assigning basic rights and duties, and that its rules 
establish a proper balance between competing claims. Whereas a conception includes, beside 
this, principles and criteria for deciding which distinctions are arbitrary and when a balance 
between competing claims is proper. People can agree on the meaning of the concept of justice 
and still be at odds, since they affirm different principles and standards for deciding those 
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matters. To develop a concept of justice into a conception of it is to elaborate these requisite 
principles and standards.
Accordingly, when I claim that I am currently concerned with the concept of equality 
of opportunity, I am claiming that I am concerned with equality of opportunity in its most 
abstract form.
How should we understand the concept of equality of opportunity? I propose that we 
should follow Peter Westen (1985) in viewing the concept of equality of opportunity as 
composed of four distinct elements. They are as follows:
1. A distributive pattern, namely, equality;
2. A description of the subjects between whom the pattern is to hold, such as all 
members of a particular district or all citizens of a state;
3. A distributive object around which the pattern is focused, such as jobs, resources 
or welfare;
4. An account of the obstacle(s) to achieving the object that ought to be absent or 
equalised as an obstacle(s), such as wealth, physical strength or skin colour.
Each of the above elements is a necessary part of the concept of equality of opportu-
nity; without any one element, the described concept would no longer be the concept of 
equality of opportunity. If one hopes to move from the abstract concept to a particular 
conception of equality of opportunity, one has to provide a particular account of the ele-
ments that compose the conception. That is, one has to describe who is the subject of the 
conception, which obstacles are relevant for opportunity and which goods constitute the 
object of the opportunity.
On this view, to say that a certain set of individuals ought to have equal opportunity is 
to say that a particular set of obstacles should, or should not, be allowed to differentiate 
the individuals’ achievement of some object. It does not mean that all of the obstacles 
that the individuals face to achieving the object must be the same.1 This conforms to 
ordinary language statements regarding equality of opportunity. For example, when we 
ask whether equality of opportunity holds between some group of job candidates, we 
typically require that the candidates be filtered without reference to particular character-
istics such as race or gender. On the given conception, then, race and gender must not 
constitute obstacles that differentiate between candidates for equality of opportunity to 
exist. Similarly, when we ask whether equality of opportunity holds between athletes in 
the 100-m sprint, we typically require that each athlete uses only particular types of 
sportswear, is not taking performance-enhancing drugs and so forth. Here, drugs and 
particularly advantageous sportswear are identified as obstacles that must not differenti-
ate between the candidates, and we will say that equality of opportunity exists although 
some runners are much faster than others. In both cases, and in ordinary language gener-
ally, equality of opportunity need not require that each member of the subject group 
actually be able to or has an equal chance of attaining the object.2
I want to suggest one change to Westen’s account concerning the role played by 
‘equality’ within the four-part structure. Westen (1985) claims that a commitment to 
equality is merely ‘derivative’ of the other three elements. By this he means that the 
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demand for equality of opportunity between some group of individuals for some object 
is derivative of the demand that each individual should have some stipulated absolute 
level of opportunity for some object. Or, as he puts it,
in the presence of stipulated standards of opportunity, one has no need to identify equality 
among agents because the standards themselves tell us everything we need to know: the 
standards themselves tell us who has (or ought to have) such opportunities and who lacks (or 
ought to lack) them. (Westen, 1985)
I believe this a mistake. Rather than seeing equality of opportunity as composed of four 
elements, one of which is derivative of the other three, we should see equality of oppor-
tunity as composed of four elements each of which is open to interpretation. In addition 
to giving account of who are the subjects and what are the relevant obstacles and objects, 
we must give account of the value underlying our conception of equality of opportunity. 
The following two points justify my suggested change.
First, sometimes we care about equality of opportunity because we care about the 
relative entitlements of individuals and not, as Westen suggests, because each has an 
absolute entitlement of equal strength to some level of opportunity.3 For example, on 
some prominent accounts, equality of opportunity is important when and because fair-
ness requires proportionality in the satisfaction of claims and claims are initially equal 
(Broome, 1990–1991). On this type of view, a fair distribution is an equal distribution 
even if this means none of the parties receive anything. Here, equality of opportunity is 
important precisely because each ought to have the same opportunities, not because any-
one ought to have a particular amount of opportunity.
Second, Westen’s view obscures the important role value plays within a conception 
of equality of opportunity. An account of value is needed to explain why the particular 
distributive pattern, namely, equality, is important. In building a conception of equal-
ity of opportunity, we must have in mind a value that we hope to realise. To see this, 
consider again the case of a race. A runner has developed a new kind of footwear. It 
is compatible with the existing regulations but gives her a considerable advantage. It 
is up to you to decide whether to allow the footwear or amend the regulation. In order 
to do this, you must reason about the value that motivates the race and whether or not 
allowing the footwear will promote that value or detract from it. For instance, you 
might determine that the relevant value is the identification of athletic excellence and 
that the shoes will act to mask this, giving you reason to amend the regulations. Or 
you might determine that it is simply the display of speed that is valuable, and so find 
reason not to amend. It is only when you have the value in mind that you will be able 
to determine what obstacles, in this case footwear, count as legitimate and which do 
not. It is the value you hope to realise in the race that will colour your conception of 
equality of opportunity.
In sum, debates about equality of opportunity are debates about which values should 
be considered relevant and which are the weightiest. Only by focusing on questions of 
value will we be able to tell whether we care about the relative or absolute levels of 
opportunity individuals have. Only if we make explicit what value supports equality of 
opportunity will the debate become more transparent and therefore more tractable.
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Value and equality of opportunity in education
What kind of values might inform our concern with equality of opportunity in education? 
Two broad categories of value can be distinguished.4 First are values that are concerned 
with the good. This category is potentially very broad (as broad as the number of ways 
something can be good). It might include well-being, knowledge and many other things 
besides. I do not mean to claim that all of these values might plausibly inform a concern 
with equality of opportunity in education. But some do.
To see how this kind of value is often invoked in public discourse about equality of 
opportunity in education, consider an affirmative action policy at a public university. The 
policy demands that we give extra weight to applications from individuals of a particular 
racial group, Native Americans. Proponents of the policy observe that Native Americans 
are currently underrepresented in universities and in the positions of power that univer-
sity attendance is often a prerequisite for. They argue that the policy is justified because 
better representation of Native Americans in government and other positions of power 
will lead to a higher quality of democracy and better civic outcomes. Opponents of the 
policy accept that Native Americans are underrepresented. Nevertheless, they argue that 
granting their applications extra weight – or indeed any other groups’ applications extra 
weight – will result in less academically able students taking up positions within the 
university.5 This will lead to a lower level of academic excellence. And, since we have 
reason to value academic excellence, the policy should be rejected and the university 
should select candidates solely on the basis of academic ability. Here, we have two con-
flicting conceptions of equality of opportunity, each supported by different values con-
cerned with the good. On one hand, there are the civic values of the outcomes we realise 
through having a more representative democracy. On the other hand, there is the value of 
academic excellence. It is deciding which of these values we have reason to endorse, or 
how much weight each should be given, that will determine the contours of the concep-
tion of equality of opportunity that the university ought to employ, in particular what 
should count as an obstacle to admission.
The second general category of value must be defined in opposition to the first: values 
that are not concerned with the good. Again this category is very broad. It includes values 
such as justice, legitimacy and consent. Typically, these values are seen as constraints on 
how we may pursue the good. As before, not all of these values might plausibly inform a 
concern for equality of opportunity in education. But some do.
Consider the following example of how the affirmative action policy might be 
defended (or opposed) with reference to a value that is not concerned with the good. The 
government, faced with the problem of how to structure university admission, puts the 
matter to a referendum. The result of the referendum is that the affirmative action should 
be applied. Having been selected by the referendum, that conception of opportunity is 
now supported by the value of legitimacy and so the government acts to realise it. Notice 
how the value of legitimacy may be thought to act as a constraint. Having bound itself to 
the result of the referendum, the government must act in accordance with it even if the 
government believes more good might be realised by a different policy.
This way of conceptualising debates about equality of opportunity – recognising that 
different legitimate but competing values may motivate competing conceptions – allows 
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us to improve on the account provided by Christopher Jencks. His deliberately simplified 
account breaks versions of equality of opportunity into categories with labels such as 
‘democratic equality’, ‘moralistic justice’, ‘weak humane justice’ and ‘strong human 
justice’, with the suggestion that only one conception is valuable or at least that only one 
may be selected. But it is not necessarily true that there is only one value that should 
inform the final conception of equality of opportunity we select. The correct conception 
might be a compromise between more than one value, and even if it is not, we will have 
a more constructive dialogue with our opponents if we recognise the underlying values 
that people with different views are invoking.
Equality of opportunity through and for education
There is a further question that to my knowledge has been overlooked in debates about 
equality of opportunity in education, namely, how does ‘education’ connect to ‘equality 
of opportunity’. In what follows, I will sketch two different ways this connection might 
be made.
First, education may be a vehicle for the realisation of some more general conception 
of equality of opportunity. On this view, the task is to first identify what general concep-
tion of equality of opportunity is supported by some value, before then determining how 
education should be employed to achieve that conception. For instance, if the conception 
of equality of opportunity requires that each individual should have the same means for 
a good life with differences in how they fare depending only on natural talent and choices 
to expend effort, the educational system could then be employed to provide remedial 
treatment for those individuals who had been disadvantaged outside of education. 
Equality of opportunity in education will be achieved in so far as the educational system 
serves to realise the more general conception of equality of opportunity. One might call 
this type of view ‘equality of opportunity through education’.
Second, a conception of equality of opportunity may apply directly to education itself. 
This view does not see education solely as a vehicle; rather it is the educational system 
and those in it that are the sole concern of equality of opportunity. Indeed, it is a distin-
guishing feature of this view that it makes no reference to any more general conception 
of equality of opportunity. For example, a conception of equality of opportunity in edu-
cation might require that goods are distributed evenly within schools and exams are 
structured so as to reward the most able, irrespective of how this affects any more general 
conceptions of equality of opportunity. One might call this type of view ‘equality of 
opportunity for education’.
The distinction between equality of opportunity ‘through’ and ‘for’ education can also 
be explained in terms of the more general distinction between instrumental and intrinsic 
value. That distinction is typically applied to whether a particular good is valuable for the 
other goods it can lead to or for its own sake. By contrast, the cut between ‘through’ and 
‘for’ applies the instrumental/intrinsic distinction to the distribution of goods within par-
ticular educational contexts. It is concerned with whether the distribution of goods within 
schools, and perhaps other educational settings such as university and adult learning, is 
important in itself, or whether it is important because of the education’s contribution to 
the distribution of goods beyond schooling.
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There is a tendency to think that equality of opportunity through education must be 
the correct view. After all, this seems most congruent with the attractive thought that it is 
a person’s life, taken as a whole, that constitutes the fundamental unit of moral concern. 
But there are a number of philosophers who have defended positions that can be read to 
support equality of opportunity for education. For one, Norman Daniels (1981, 1988, 
2008), expanding on Rawls, has argued that we should be concerned not only with how 
individuals fare over their whole lives, but also how they fare in particular age-groups, 
including age-groups like 11–16 where people are enrolled in education. On his view, 
justice places distributive constraints within particular age-groups, with these constraints 
determined by how one would choose to distribute goods and opportunities across a 
lifetime in a hypothetical choice situation. For another, Michael Walzer’s view that there 
are ‘Spheres of Justice’ gives education an importance that is independent of its wider 
distributive implications. On his account, different goods have their own distributive 
principles, and so, in so far as education is a distinct good distributed via the educational 
system, the distribution of education can be determined without reference to how other 
goods are distributed (Walzer, 1983).
There are also everyday examples where we seem to value distributions within 
schools for their own sake. Consider the policy that each child should wear a school 
uniform. It is plausible that children should wear school uniforms even if this has no 
impact on how far these children succeed outside of the education system. This policy 
might be defended on the grounds that it displays the equal status of children. Furthermore, 
the case for thinking education might be special becomes even stronger when one con-
siders that school is one of the only periods in a person’s life where the state forces her 
to undergo a particular kind of training and enrolment. If this sort of coercion has special 
moral significance, it might also generate particular, context-specific, moral principles.
Having made this distinction, let me be clear that my aim is not to defend either view. 
Rather, I hope the distinction can be used to help clarify existing debates, allowing others 
to make those substantive arguments more clearly. For example, consider the following 
statements by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2008):
Education is a crucial gateway to these rewards [income, wealth, status, positions of occupational 
advantage]; a person’s level and kind of educational achievement typically has a major influence 
on where she will end up in the distribution of those potentially life-enhancing goods. It is 
unfair, then, if some get a worse education than others because, through no fault or choice of 
their own, this puts them at a disadvantage.
The Meritocratic Conception: An individual’s prospects for educational achievement may be a 
function of that individual’s talent and effort, but they should not be influenced by his or her 
social class background.
These two statements, given just a page apart, can be read as offering two subtly dif-
ferent conceptions of equality of opportunity in education. The first is a conception of 
equality of opportunity through education. It identifies certain goods, such as income and 
wealth, as being constitutive of some form of ‘life-enhancing’ advantage and observes 
that it is unfair when some receive better education than others because this will lead to 
unchosen or undeserved inequalities in these goods. The education system is seen as a 
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vehicle. It is not important for its own sake. It is important because it may lead to ine-
qualities in these further advantages. The second statement is a conception of equality of 
opportunity for education. It applies strictly to the educational system, making explicit 
reference to the goods of educational achievement as the object of the conception. The 
cut between ‘through’ and ‘for’ allows us to accurately distinguish these conceptions of 
equality of opportunity in education. It also raises questions about how Swift and 
Brighouse conceive of their position, whether their statements are consistent, whether 
they believe one conception is primary and so forth.
Finally, note that the distinction between ‘through’ and ‘for’ can be made with respect 
to how equality of opportunity relates to any particular subfield, not only education. The 
relevant distinction is always just whether the distribution of goods in a particular set-
ting, say healthcare, is important for its own sake or important because it serves to realise 
some broader distributive pattern.
Scope and equality of opportunity in education
So far, I have argued that discussion of equality of opportunity in education must be 
sensitive to the different values that one hopes to realise, and I have distinguished two 
ways in which we might think about equality of opportunity in education, ‘for’ and 
‘through’. In this section, I want to introduce one final distinction. It concerns the level 
of application, or as I will call it the ‘scope’, of equality of opportunity in education. It 
concerns whose duty it is to realise a particular conception.
My claim is that there may be different conceptions of equality of opportunity in 
education that operate simultaneously with different scopes. Some may have an insti-
tutional scope; others may have an interpersonal scope. Conceptions of equality of 
opportunity with an institutional scope are concerned with the state and the public 
institutions of society, including educational institutions. These conceptions determine 
how public institutions ought to be structured and create duties for individuals holding 
particular positions within these institutions. Conceptions of equality of opportunity 
with an interpersonal scope are concerned with us, our everyday lives and the states of 
affairs we may bring about. They guide our actions and create duties for us in a great 
range of contexts including our interactions with our children, friends and even distant 
strangers.6
The distinction between the different scopes of conceptions of equality of opportunity 
and the duties they create is familiar from our everyday practice. Here is an example. 
Suppose that a certain conception of equality of opportunity in education requires a strict 
equality in the allocation of state resources to individual students. This conception is sup-
ported by the value of justice. According to this conception, Andrew, a teacher, would act 
wrongly if he were, qua state agent, to give additional resources to particular students. 
But Andrew might also be a parent. The conception applies only to what the state may do 
and so only to what Andrew may do when acting as an agent of the state. It does not 
extend to Andrew’s private life. Privately, Andrew might endorse an alternative account 
of the value of equality of opportunity in education. When acting as a parent, his favoured 
conception may lead him to spend more resources on some children than others. Here, 
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there exist two conceptions of equality of opportunity in education that have different 
scopes and which the same individual adheres to, one after the other.
To see why we need principles with different scopes, note that institutions and 
individuals face different ethical considerations. For example, note the reasons Rawls 
gives for rejecting what has become known as the ‘luck egalitarian’ conception of 
equality of opportunity which demands that individuals’ levels of well-being are 
responsibility-sensitive. First, Rawls rejects the idea that well-being could be appro-
priate for governing institutional arrangements because no particular conception of 
well-being could serve as the basis of agreement between people with different com-
prehensive conceptions of the good. The key thought here is that no conception of 
well-being could be legitimate – the focus of political agreement – as it would privi-
lege some people’s particular comprehensive conception of the good over others 
(Rawls, 1999). Second, Rawls rejects the idea that it would be practical for institu-
tions to make fine-grained judgments about responsibility. Not only is what counts as 
responsible action controversial, the state could not have access to the information 
necessary to determine which part of some superficially deserving action, such as a 
display of effort, was actually attributable to the person and which was the product of 
their circumstances (Rawls, 1999).
These are powerful arguments. They show that the luck egalitarian conception is not 
appropriate as an institutional conception. However, they do not show (and Rawls does 
not claim that they show) that the luck egalitarian conception is not appropriate as an 
interpersonal conception. With respect to the first argument, the kinds of legitimacy 
considerations Rawls mentions are not generally thought to apply to our everyday inter-
actions with those around us.7 Rather we may act on our own comprehensive concep-
tion of the good, including our own favoured conception of well-being, when interacting 
with others. With respect to the second argument, while it is undoubtedly true that the 
state could not have adequate information to make these responsibility judgements, the 
same is not true of individuals. Some people will have lived with others for extended 
periods of time, become familiar with them and their history, and will therefore have a 
wealth of personal information with which to make responsibility judgements. Indeed, 
we make such judgements all the time. We make them when determining whether those 
close to us have acted well or poorly and hold them responsible accordingly. In our 
personal interactions, fine-grained judgements about other individuals seem both una-
voidable and appropriate. To return to the case of Andrew, it might be quite right that he 
should act on one conception of equality of opportunity in education in his capacity as 
a teacher, but that he should act on quite another in his capacity as a parent. The extra 
information he has at his disposal as a parent and the absence of legitimacy constraints 
change the kinds of judgements it is appropriate for him to make in that role. Reasons 
that make a conception appropriate at one level may not be present at another.
Of course, I am not claiming that the luck egalitarian conception of equality of oppor-
tunity is correct. My aim is only to illustrate how different reasons may apply, making 
different conceptions of equality of opportunity appropriate for different scopes. There 
may be different conceptions of equality of opportunity that individuals have a duty to 
realise depending on their role at a particular time.
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Conclusion
In closing the article, let me briefly address a pair of objections. As I have described it, equal-
ity of opportunity may be concerned with any one of a number of different, sometimes con-
flicting, values. Perhaps this squeezes too much into equality of opportunity in education. 
Rather than caring about equality of opportunity in education because it is fair, efficient or 
agreed to, equality of opportunity in education might be something that we care about for its 
own sake with no further value supporting it. In fact, I have not denied this. It is possible 
(although I do not think plausible) that our concern with equality is foundational. The overall 
conceptual structure would still apply. What I have argued is that usually equality of opportu-
nity operates as a sort of short-hand. Often when people claim they are in favour of equality 
of opportunity, they are, consciously or not, invoking some further value. Equality taken 
alone seems under-motivated. When one is asked why a particular group of individuals 
should be treated as equals, further justification is usually appealed to, such as ‘because only 
this respects their equal status’ or ‘because we need to determine who is the most excellent’.
What about the concern that in identifying many possible conceptions of equality of 
opportunity in education, but not arguing for any particular conception, the preceding 
analysis does not conclusively determine what we ought to do with respect to reforming 
the educational system? This concern is valid. The preceding analysis does not aim to 
identify the correct conception of equality of opportunity in education, let alone consider 
how it could best be realised in practice. What it aims to do is to make sense of existing 
statements about equality of opportunity in education, explaining disagreement about 
equality of opportunity in education, and equality of opportunity more generally, as disa-
greement about the values that we should aim to respond to. If it is successful, it won’t 
conclusively determine which conception of equality of opportunity we should endorse, 
but it will provide a framework from which a more satisfactory account of equality of 
opportunity in education can be developed.
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Notes
1. This account of the concept of opportunity implicit here is relevantly similar to Gerald 
MacCallum’s account of the concept of freedom. MacCallum argues that all statements about 
freedom can be expressed in the form:
‘X is (is not) free from Y to do (not do, become, not become) Z’, where X ranges over agents, 
Y ranges over such ‘preventing conditions’ as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and bar-
riers, and Z ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance.
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It needs a slightly different linguistic construction, but statements of opportunity can be 
expressed in the form,
X has an opportunity for Z, when X may choose to pursue Z in the absence of some obstacle 
Y, where X ranges over agents, Y ranges over ‘preventing conditions’, or as I have called 
them ‘obstacles’, and Z ranges over the possible objects of the opportunity.
This account is slightly different from the account offered by Peter Westen. For Westen, hav-
ing an opportunity requires that none of the obstacles are ‘insurmountable’. I reject this addi-
tional requirement because it seems that often we talk about someone having an opportunity 
although an insurmountable obstacle was present. A second distinctive feature of the formula 
I have offered is the ‘may choose to pursue’ clause. Strictly speaking, an opportunity is not 
only the absence of an obstacle because sometimes the absence of an obstacle means one 
will certainly arrive at some object, such as when the absence of a chair means that one will 
certainly hit the floor. For an opportunity to be present, it must be the case that an individual 
may choose not to pursue some object. My thanks to Daniel McDermott for this last point 
(MacCallum, 1967).
2. Note that my general claim is only that at the level of concept, equality of opportunity state-
ments do not entail that each member of the subject group actually be able to or has a chance 
of achieving some object. This is entirely compatible with believing that the most morally 
compelling conception of opportunity should include these requirements.
3. The distinction offered here between relative and absolute ways of valuing equality of oppor-
tunity is relevantly similar to Joel Feinberg’s distinction between comparative and non-com-
parative justice (Feinberg, 1974).
4. In referring to values here, I am referring to what Shelly Kagan calls factors as opposed to 
foundations (Kagan, 1997).
5. This does not imply holding the false position that Native Americans have less natural talent. 
The opponents could accept that native talent was equally distributed across all persons but 
argue that because some have been disadvantaged and so have not had the chance to develop 
their academic skills, some individuals are now less skilled and so make less good candidates
6. For a classic statement of two different understandings of the relationship between the moral 
and the political, see John Rawls (1982).
7. Note that there are some authors who assert that the same kinds of constraints should be 
applied to our personal interactions (Matthew Clayton, 2006).
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